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This paper examines the German venture capital (VC) syndicate networks and to 
what extent certain characteristics of VC companies determine the investors’ 
interconnectedness. The data used contains detailed information on 300 VC 
investments and their investors from the years 2004 and 2005. The analysis shows 
that the age of the VC companies dichotomously influences the syndicate 
networks of the investors – a negative influence for young and very old VC firms 
and a positive one for those firms in which are not very old. In contrast, the fact of 
being privately held or under governmental influence does not affect the number 
of network ties of the VC firms. The analysis reveals no indication for any 
geographical or spatial influences on the number of syndication partners that a VC 
company has within its network.  
 
 
JEL-classification:  G24, O16, R10. 







„Venture Capital Syndizierungsnetzwerke – die Determinanten der 
Vernetzung von Investoren“ 
 
Dieser Artikel untersucht die Venture Capital (VC) Syndizierungsnetzwerke in 
Deutschland und inwieweit bestimmte Charakteristika der beteiligten VC 
Gesellschaften die Vernetzung der Investoren beeinflussen. Der verwendete 
Datensatz besteht aus 300 VC Investitionen und deren Investoren aus den Jahren 
2004 und 2005. Die Analyse macht deutlich, dass das Alter der VC Gesellschaften 
einen dichotomen Einfluss auf die Syndizierungsnetzwerke hat – negativ für sehr 
junge und sehr alte Gesellschaften, ansonsten positiv. Es kann jedoch kein 
Unterscheid zwischen öffentlichen und privaten VC Investoren in Bezug auf die 
Anzahl der Netzwerkverbindungen der Financiers festgestellt werden. Die 
Untersuchung zeigt keine Anzeichen für geographische oder regionale Einflüsse 
auf die Anzahl der Syndizierungspartner einer VC Gesellschaft im Netzwerk. 
 
 
JEL-Klassifikation:  G24, O16, R10. 
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1.  Introduction 
Research examining both the networks of VC companies built through syndicated 
venture capital (VC) investments as well as geographical and spatial influences on 
the VC markets is somewhat insufficient. Most of the studies either focus on the 
geographical aspects (Powell, Koput, Bowie and Smith-Doerrs, 2002; Martin, 
Sunley and Turner, 2002; Fritsch and Schilder, 2007) or on the syndication of VC 
investments
1. Only a few studies combine both lines of research, including the 
study by Sorensen and Stuart (2001) and the work of Bygrave (1987, 1988). 
However, research is mainly limited to the US VC market which shows certain 
particularities such as large spatial distances. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
the key players within the networks are not completely explored, e.g., the role of 
public authorities within VC syndicate networks. Therefore, additional research 
on VC syndicate networks and the geographical and spatial influences seems to be 
necessary. 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the interconnectedness of VC companies 
within syndicate networks. Syndication means that “… two or more venture 
capital firms come together to take an equity stake in an investment” (Wright and 
Lockett, 2003, 2074). The more network ties a VC firm has in form of syndication 
partners, the higher its degree centrality of the network is and the larger its own 
syndicate network is. However, past research (see for example Sorensen and 
Stuart, 2001 and Bygrave, 1987, 1988) does not entirely explain to what extend 
different characteristics of VC companies and, especially, spatial and 
geographical aspects influence the network position of a VC company – in other 
words to what extend the VC firms are connected with other investors. The logical 
question raised in this context is: “What determines the number of ties to 
syndication partners of a VC company within a syndicate network?” The analysis 
of this study examines the characteristics of the VC firms that influence their 
                                                 
1 Manigart, Lockett, Meuleman, Wright, Landström, Bruining, Desbrières and Hommel., 2006; 




degree centrality within the network, which is measured by the number of 
different syndication partners each VC firms has. To answer this question, a 
dataset based on more than 300 VC investments made in Germany in the years 
2004 and 2005 is used. The results of the analyses show which individual 
characteristics of VC investors, including their age, their geographical location or 
their spatial investment behavior lead to a central position within a syndicate 
network, i.e., a large individual network of a VC firm. The findings also indicate 
the role of different types of VC firms in the German VC market, e.g., by a 
comparison of privately held VC firms and VC companies that are under 
governmental influence.  
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. The second 
section contains the rationale of VC syndication. Thereafter, important 
assumptions regarding the influential factors of the position of VC firms within a 
syndicate network are hypothesized, which are based on a review of the literature 
(Section 3). The data are then introduced in Section 4and the syndicate network 
relationships in Germany are described. Then, the empirical analysis follows 
(Section 5) based on the hypothesis of different determinants affecting the 
network position of VC companies. Section 6 concludes and discusses 
implications for further research.  
 
2.  Venture Capital Syndication 
The venture capital (VC) business is not a lonesome activity of individual 
investors working separately; it is often the case that VC investments are 
syndicated (Lerner, 1994). Syndication in this context means that more than one 
VC investor is involved in the investment (Wright and Lockett, 2003). Even 
though all participating VC firms are taking a stake in the investment, their 
function within the syndicate may differ. The role of the financiers ranges 
between active lead investors (they do not only invest but also offer further 
services such as consulting) and the more or less passive co-investors (they 




company is incorporated in different syndicates with various syndication partners. 
A so-called syndicate network develops from this cooperation (Bygrave, 1988; 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). The more syndication partners in different syndicates 
a VC company has, the larger the specific syndication network of the individual 
VC firm is.  
The syndication of VC investments has various reasons. Each phase of a VC 
investment has its own characteristics, i.e., the search for possible target 
companies, the act of investing itself, the monitoring and consulting of the 
portfolio firm during the investment and the exit of the investment (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). Hence, different reasons or rationales for syndication emerge from 
the phases of a VC investment (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). In the pre-investment 
stage, syndication, or more precisely the possible syndication of investments, 
might help to find and to evaluate target companies (Manigart et al., 2006; 
Lockett and Wright, 2001). If one VC company identifies a possible investment, it 
might ask other VC companies to syndicate. For these VC firms, the invitation to 
syndicate eases the search for investments, i.e. the so-called deal flow.  
Within the next phase of an investment, known as the investment decision, 
syndication might be helpful or even necessary. Firstly, one investor might not be 
able or willing to raise enough capital for the investment individually (DeClerq 
and Dimov, 2004, Brander, Amit and Antweiler, 2002); the VC company needs 
help from other investors. Secondly, it is an advantage to share the investment 
even though the investor is able to manage the investment alone. Possible reasons 
are risk reduction through portfolio diversification for the individual VC company 
and a combined evaluation of the investment (Lockett and Wright, 1999, 2001; 
Cumming, 2006). Additionally, due diligence done by different VC companies 
might be more valuable than that of a single investor (Lerner, 1994).  
Once the investment is made, syndication is also advantageous for the 
participating investors (Brander et al., 2002). These benefits apply to the 
additional services that VC companies provide to their portfolio firms, such as 
monitoring, advising and consulting. Through syndication, the costs of these 




saved. Furthermore, the syndication partners can combine their resources 
(DeClerq and Dimov, 2004). This is especially important if one syndication 
partner is located close to the investment and other investors are further away 
from the portfolio firm (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006, 2007; Sorensen and Stuart, 
2001). In this case, the VC company that is located closest to the investment can 
do most of the monitoring and advising activities on site. The distantly located 
syndication partners benefit from this proximity, e.g., through reduced costs of 
monitoring and traveling (Fritsch and Schilder, 2007).  
Even if the VC investment comes to an end syndication might be helpful for 
the VC companies. One possible example is the exit through a trade sale, which is 
the sale of the venture’s shares to an industrial company. This is one of the most 
important ways of exiting a VC investment in Germany (German Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association, 2006). Trade sales might be easier if more than 
one investor is involved. The different financiers have contact to different possible 
buyers for the stakes of an investment. Therefore, the search for a trade sale 
partner is eased. After an exit, the fact that an investment has been syndicated can 
still be valuable. The participating investors might remember their syndication 
partners when they search for future co-investors, especially, if the syndicate was 
successful (Manigart et al., 2006; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Again, this allows 
an easier deal flow for the VC company. 
 
3.  Syndicate Networks and the Characteristics of the Key Players 
The reasoning for syndication gives evidence for the role of syndicate networks. 
A syndicate network is composed of a number of VC companies that have a 
relationship to each other through their joint investments (Bygrave, 1988; 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Based on this definition one is able to depict the 
syndicate network by simply starting with one specific VC company. Its syndicate 
network partners are all investors that have involvement in any of the VC 
company’s investment syndicates. As each individual network partner of the VC 




VC syndicate network exists for the whole or nearly the whole market, e.g., 
within one country. Past research on VC syndicate networks and spatial 
determinants focused on the reasons of syndication and syndicate networks 
(Bygrave, 1987, 1988) or on the impact of syndicate networks on the spatial 
investment behavior of VC firms (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). However, these 
studies show two main limitations. First, they are restricted to the US VC market 
which is said to be rather unique in regard to its development (Martin et al., 2002), 
its investment activity (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996) or its geographical 
structure (Martin et al., 2002). Second, they do not entirely explore which 
determinants turn VC investors into active network players, such as the role of 
governmental influence on VC syndication behavior.  
The role of different actors within a syndicate network is important for VC 
companies. According to network analysis theory, the more ties a financier has to 
other VC firms through syndication, which corresponds to its individual co-
investment network, the more central its position within the network is 
(Wassermann and Faust, 1994, 178), and the more it can benefit from the network 
(Bygrave, 1988). First, a large network of co-investors eases the search for further 
investments because the co-investors might invite the VC company to participate 
in deals of which they have not heard (Bygrave, 1987; Manigart et al., 2006). 
Second, a group of co-investors helps to find a syndication partner for various 
kinds of future investments. A suitable co-investor might enable the VC company 
to expand the provided services for the portfolio company (Brander et al., 2002), 
to ensure sufficient capital availability for large investments (Lerner, 1994) and to 
overcome the problems attached to investments that are located far away from the 
VC company (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006, 2007). For these reasons, it is important 
to understand what determines a well interconnected network position of VC 
firms.  
One important characteristic of a VC company with regard to its position 
within the syndicate network is the VC firm’s age (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
First, the older the VC company is, the more experienced its management is said 




different contacts, both personal links as well as through work experience. Due to 
these contacts, the co-investment and syndication of VC deals can emerge 
(Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Second, older VC companies have a longer history 
of past VC syndicates than young VC firms. These co-investments might be able 
to help find syndication partners or be invited to syndicate themselves. The trust 
established during a past syndication is an important advantage for future deals 
(Wright and Lockett, 2003). If the earlier joint investment was successful, this 
cohesion might be even stronger. Finally, a good and sustainable track record 
strengthens the reputation of the VC firm and encourages other VC companies to 
participate with the successful VC company in the same syndicate (Lockett and 
Wright, 1999). A young VC firm does not have this track record and its 
management might be less experienced than older VC firms (Sorensen and Stuart, 
2002). Therefore, it can be assumed that older VC firms have a central position 
within the syndicate network and show a variety of co-investment ties in 
comparison to the younger VC investors do. 
 
H1: The older a VC company is the better it is interconnected via syndicates. 
 
The second possible determinant of the VC firm’s network position is a spatial 
argument. The larger the individual network of the VC company is, i.e., the higher 
its degree centrality within the overall network is, the more likely the investor will 
have investments that are located further away from its own location (Sorensen 
and Stuart, 2001). There are two main reasons for this assumption. Firstly, with 
increasing spatial distance it will become more difficult to find and to evaluate 
suitable investment opportunities (Manigart et al., 2006; Lockett and Wright, 
2001). Making use of a large syndicate network can ease the search and 
evaluation of target companies. Secondly, syndication might be used to overcome 
the problems of investments that are located further away from the investor such 
as long traveling distances for the monitoring and consulting of the portfolio firm 
(Fritsch and Schilder, 2006). If one syndication partner is located close to the 
investment, it can undertake the services that need to be done on site of the 




Under such circumstances the other syndication partners can be located farther 
away and do not have to be at the investment very often. Therefore, multiple 
relationships to different syndication partners might help to find, evaluate, and 
manage distantly located investments. In other words, a large spatial investment 
behavior of VC firms requires and entails many network ties to other VC 
investors.  
 
H2: VC companies with a large spatial investment behavior tend to have a central 
role within the overall syndicate network. 
 
As a third determinant, the geographical dispersion of the VC suppliers might 
influence the interconnectedness of syndicate networks. For instance, although the 
German VC market is less spatially clustered than the US market (Powell et al., 
2002; Florida, Smith and Sechoka, 1991), it has several VC centers including 
Munich, Frankfurt/Main, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Berlin and the Rhine-Ruhr area 
(Fritsch and Schilder, 2007; Martin et al., 2002). VC companies that are located in 
these core centers might have a more central position within the overall VC 
syndicate network (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). The spatial proximity to many 
other VC firms might spur their personal contacts within the VC community 
which, in turn, might lead to possible contacts to syndication partners. In return, 
the VC companies that are located in a peripheral region might have a 
disadvantage with regard to their contacts to other investors and, therefore, their 
syndicate network. Thus, being located in one of the German VC centers might 
lead to a higher level of interconnectedness of a VC company within a syndicate 
network than that of investors in peripheral regions. 
 
H3: VC companies that are located in financial centers have more syndication ties 
than investors in peripheral regions. 
 
Finally, the background of the VC company, in this context, that means 




privately held, might have an impact on its number of co-investors and its 
personal syndicate network. Many public VC companies are restricted in regard to 
their investments to a certain region (Doran and Bannock, 2000; Sunley, Klagge, 
Berndt and Martin, 2005). Their main goal is to ensure a sufficient supply of 
capital for entrepreneurship and innovative activity in one specific area (Schilder, 
2006; McGlue, 2002). Therefore, they have to work as a magnet attracting capital 
from outside their resident region and multiplying their own supply of capital 
through syndication. Furthermore, the private syndication partners can strongly 
benefit from the public VC companies’ access to local networks (Sunley et al., 
2005), which might be advantageous for their deal flow and for the evaluation of 
the target company. Therefore, a public VC investor as syndication partner should 
be an interesting co-investor for private VC suppliers. For that reason, public VC 
firms might have more co-investments than their private counterparts, which is 
equal to a more central position within the overall syndicate network. 
 
H4: VC companies under governmental influence are at least as interconnected as 
privately held financiers 
 
4.  Analysis 
4.1  Data 
The analysis is based on a set of data containing details about German VC 
investments at the micro-level. Data have been provided by VC facts, a company 
which collects information about VC investments in Germany. It contains 
information on 134 and 174 VC investments for the years 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. This equals nearly half of the early stage investments that are 
recorded by the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2005). 
There is a clear investment focus in certain industries. More than 36 percent of the 
investments are in the biotechnology industry to be followed by investments in 
software related businesses (14 percent). Around six percent of the financed start-




This is similar to the industry focus of the investments made by the members of 
the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2005). One-quarter 
of the investors in the analysis are under public influence, and the remainder is 
privately held. Only slightly more than one-half of the VC companies under 
investigation are located in the German VC centers which is less than that of the 
overall market (Fritsch and Schilder, 2007). However, it still can be assumed that 
this sample is representative for the overall VC activity in Germany during the 
time period under investigation. For the objectives of this paper, the focus is on 
detailed information about the age and the location of the VC investors, their 
syndicate network and their spatial investment behavior. Based on the addresses 
of the VC firms and their investments, the average traveling distance between an 
investor and a portfolio company and between the co-investors within a syndicate 
was calculated. The internet-based route planner map24.de was used to calculate 
the distances.  
In the sample 199 of the 308 VC investments are syndicated, i.e., there is 
more than one investor involved. Within these syndicates 825 pairs of investor 
and the respective portfolio company can be identified. Furthermore, the number 
of pairs of investors that are involved in n investments can be counted, e.g., if a 
venture has two investors there exists one pair of co-investors. The data contain 
2,107 pairs of co-investors that are involved within syndicates. Due to many 
missing values, the analysis is only based on a considerable smaller number of 
observations. The missing information mainly includes the age of some VC 
companies and the addresses of both informal VC investors and foreign investors. 
These investors are excluded from the following analysis. Furthermore, the data 
do not contain information about passive governmental co-investors, such as the 
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau. Due to their merely passive syndication 
behavior without providing any additional services, these investors might not 






Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Minimum  Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Age of portfolio 
company  
(in years) 
4.84  4.00 0.00 36.00 3.84 
Age of VC 
company  
(in years) 
10.43 7.00  0.00  57.94  10.12 
Overall amount of 
capital invested (in 
million €) 
8.21  5.00 0.15 35.00 8.65 








4.17  3.00 1.00 12.00 2.59 
Number of 
syndication ties 
(per VC company) 
9.65 5.00  0.00  92.00  13.14 
Number of different 
syndication partners 
(per VC company) 
8.08  5.00 0.00 65.00 9.94 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of the sample. All 
figures refer to the point in time when the investment was made. On average, the 
financed companies were almost five years old whereas the VC companies 
already existed for more than ten years. The average amount invested per financed 
company and per investment amounts to slightly more than eight million Euros. 
On average, the number of investors for the syndicated investments is about 4.2. 
The average number of syndication ties per VC company is 9.65. However, this 
number does not show the network of the individual VC company in detail. If a 
VC company has two syndicates with the same syndication partner, the syndicates 
are counted as two ties. Such a tie between the two is stronger than that of a single 




partners of a single VC company is smaller than the total number of syndication 
ties. On average, the syndicate network of an individual VC company contains 
about eight different syndication partners. This relatively small difference 
between the overall number of ties of a VC company and the number of different 
co-investors of the financier might be due to the short period of time within the 
analysis. Serial investments, which are based on experiences of past syndicates, 
are not very likely within such a short period of time. 
 
4.2  What do Venture Capital Syndicate Networks Look Like? 
The syndicate network’s size of the individual VC company, which indicates the 
network position of the investor, can either be described by its overall number of 
ties to co-investors, which show the frequency of network contacts or by its 
number of different co-investors, that provides an idea about the breadth of the 
network (see Section 4.1; Bygrave, 1987). In the following analysis, the syndicate 
networks are limited to the number of different co-investors of each VC company 
for two reasons. First, the correlation coefficient of both variables is 
approximately 0.98 and highly statistically significant. Therefore, the empirical 
results do not differ considerably and both variables seem to act as good proxies 
for each other. Second, some advantages of VC syndicate networks come from 
large networks – e.g., through the sharing of information (Bygrave, 1988) – and 
depend on the number of different syndication partners. The strength of the ties 
between two VC investors might not be as important for these network benefits. If 
a VC company has ten syndicates with only the same co-investor, it still has the 
smallest possible network containing only one financier. It’s interconnection 
within the overall syndicate network is rather limited. Therefore, the number of 
different co-investors is a more appropriate indicator for the network of a VC 
company (Bygrave, 1987).  
The overall syndicate network is composed of the individual networks of the 




42). Through joint investments, the VC companies are interconnected and, 
therefore, their networks are also connected. However, some VC firms that either 
do not have syndicated investments or whose networks are isolated from other 
networks are not part of the main component of a VC syndicate network. Figure 1 
depicts the main component for the German VC market. It is the largest 
interconnected syndicate network and contains more than two-thirds of all VC 
firms in the sample used. The rest of the VC firms are either not part of any 
syndicate or are interconnected in networks that do not have more than three 
participants. The network graph only shows German VC investors and their ties to 
other German VC companies. Although, the ties to foreign investors are excluded, 
whereby a supra-national or global network could be illustrated, the overall 
German syndicate network is indicated. Furthermore, more than 50 percent of the 
German VC investments are made solely with German syndication partners 
(German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, 2006). Therefore, the 
exclusive German syndicate network is an important characteristic of the market 
with regard to domestic VC investment activity.  
Each node of the network represents one VC firm (figure 1).
2 The size of the 
node stands for the age of the investor; the older the VC company is, the larger the 
circle is. The different shadings indicate whether the VC company is public or 
private; black circles indicate VC firms that are under governmental influence and 
gray circles indicate privately held investors. The ties between the financiers 
represent the cooperation within one or more syndicates and are shown by the 
black lines. The thicker the line is, the more joint syndicates these two VC 
companies have. This equals a stronger network tie between the two investors. 
The ties and the position of the nodes do not show any geographical or spatial 
characteristics of the syndicate relationships. Furthermore, the data does not 
enable to the two other dimension of social relationships in addition to the 
strength of the tie: the content and the direction of the relationship. The more lines 
                                                 





that emerge from a VC firm, the more network ties with different financiers it has. 
Many ties coming out of a node mean that this VC company has a central position 
within the overall network because the number of ties is the simplest measure of 















Public VC companies 10-22 4-9 2-3 1 Age of VC companies
(in years)
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Public VC companies 10-22 4-9 2-3 1 Age of VC companies
(in years)
10-22 4-9 2-3 1 Age of VC companies
(in years)
1 2-5 5-10 >10 Number of joint syndicates
between two VC companies  
Figure 1: Main component of the German VC syndicate network 
Overall, the network indicates that the VC market is very well 
interconnected. However, it also shows that some VC firms are more or less key 
network players that have many different ties and keep the large network together 
(figure 1). These mostly tend to be older firms such as the VC subsidiary of 
Siemens, 3i in Frankfurt and Munich or Techno Venture Management. Most of 




influenced by public authorities, are also highly interconnected in the network. 
Among these are for example the VC subsidiary of the Merchant and 
Development Bank Berlin (IBB) and the IBG Beteiligungsgesellschaft Sachsen-
Anhalt mbH.  
The main component of the VC syndicate network shows a strong 
interconnection of the German VC market. Many of the investors have 
syndication ties with other VC firms and, in most cases, with more than one co-
investor. Furthermore, there are some key players within the network that ensure 
such a large main component. They seem to be rather old and privately held. 
However, the visual interpretation of Figure 1 still leads to an important question: 
Which determinants turn VC companies into key players of the network? In other 
words, one still has to search for characteristics that enable a single VC firm to 
develop many different syndication ties. Furthermore, the graphical interpretation 
of the syndicate network does not show any regional or spatial influences that 
might be important determinants.  
 
4.3  What Determines the Actor-Level Degree Centrality of Venture Capital 
Firms in the Syndicate Network? 
The possible determinants of the size of the VC companies’ syndicate networks 
measured by the number of different syndication partners per VC firm are 
explored in the following in-depth analysis. A negative binomial regression is 
employed because the distribution of the dependent variable is strongly skewed to 
the right. The dependent variable is the number of different syndication partners 
each VC investor has as indicator for degree centrality of the VC firms.
3 The 
independent variables depict the determinants of the interconnectedness or degree 
centrality of the VC companies (see Section 5). First, the age of the VC company  
                                                 
3 Other measures from the social network analysis at a minimum such as closeness or betweenness 
are not part of the estimations, to keep the social network analysis on a minimum without losing 




is used because older VC firms might have larger networks than young VC 
companies. Second, a dummy variable, which shows whether the VC firm is 
privately held or under governmental influence (public dummy), is used to 
demonstrate the possible differences between both types of financiers. Third, two 
variables are added to the model to explore the influence of geographical and 
spatial aspects on VC syndicate networks – a dummy variable comparing the 
investors that are located within the German VC centers and those that are not and 
a variable that shows the average distance between a VC company and its 
portfolio firms. The analysis is based on network information about 128 German 
VC firms and their syndication ties, which are part of the previously introduced 
dataset. Private individuals and foreign VC companies are excluded from the 
analysis. Furthermore, the data lacks information on the age of several of the 
investors. Therefore, they are not included in the estimations.  
The results clearly show that the age of the VC company has a statistically 
significant and positive impact on its number of different co-investors (Table 2, 
Model I). However, by adding the variable age
2, which is the square of the age of 
the VC firm, it can be seen that this influence becomes smaller over time and, 
finally, is negative (Model II). This means that the benefits of being older in 
regard to the network degree centrality of a VC firm, e.g., through the experience 
and the track record of the investor, are only important at a certain age. Very 
young companies cannot benefit from these advantages. Very old VC firms also 
do not have an advantage of being older. One reason for this dichotomous 
influence of the age might be that the older VC firms begin to rest on their laurels. 
Overall, the analysis only partly supports hypothesis 1. 
The institutional background of the VC company, i.e., whether the VC 
suppliers are privately held or under governmental influence, does not affect the 
degree centrality within VC syndicate network. The estimations do not show any 
statistically significant difference between both types of VC companies which is 
in line with hypothesis 4. Therefore, public VC companies seem to be equally 
interconnected and established within the German VC network, which might be 




(figure 1). However, they do not make more extensive use of syndication than 
their privately held counterparts to enlarge, for example, the VC supply for their 
resident region. Unfortunately, the data do not provide information about the 
current overall number of portfolio companies per investor, the amount of capital 
a VC firms has under management or the number of investment managers per 
financier. Therefore, it is not possible to control for differences in regard to the 
size of the VC companies, which might also influence the network activity of the 
investors (Bygrave, 1987). However, the age of the VC company can be regarded 
as a proxy for the size of the investor, because size and age of VC firms are often 
highly correlated (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
Table 2: Determinants of the number of syndication ties per VC company 
(negative binomial regression) 
  Number of different co-investors  
(per VC company) 
 I  II  III  IV 























Location in VC center 
(dummy) 




Average distance to investment 
(per portfolio in kilometers) 
−  −  −  0.000 
(0.08) 









2  0.001 0.034 0.035 0.035 
** Statistically significant at the 1%-level; * Statistically significant at the 5%-level; 
Number of observations: 128 
The geographical and spatial influences on the number of network ties of a 
single VC company are less pronounced than previously assumed. First, the 
location of a VC company in one of the German VC centers does not have a 




centers or in peripheral regions seem to have a similar degree centrality in the 
syndicate network (Model III). Therefore, hypothesis 3 must be rejected. This 
might be due to the composition of the data, which show a relatively high share of 
VC companies in peripheral regions. Second, the spatial investment behavior, 
which is measured by the average distance between a VC company and its 
portfolio firms, has no statistically significant influence on the number of ties of a 
VC company (Model IV). Contrary to the findings from a US study conducted by 
Sorensen and Stuart (2001) the network position of a VC investor and its spatial 
investment behavior are not related in Germany. There is no indication for 
supporting hypothesis 2 in the German VC market. This might derive from a 
distinct insignificance of spatial aspects for the German VC market (Fritsch and 
Schilder, 2007).  
Furthermore, other variables such as the spatial dimension of the syndicate 
network, indicated by the average distance between the investor and its 
syndication partners or the geographical location of the investments, do not have a 
statistically significant influence on the network position of the VC company. 
These results are not reported in the estimation tables. Overall, the estimations on 
geographical and spatial influences of the VC investors’ network position show 
that these determinants are less important than for the large and geographical 
more dispersed US VC market (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
 
5.  Conclusions and Implications 
VC companies are interconnected through a network of joint investments, the so-
called syndicates. In this paper, the VC syndicate network structure in Germany is 
explored, and, possible determinants of the role of certain VC companies within 
the network are analyzed. This study shows to what extent certain characteristics 
of the investors influence their individual or ego-network of syndication partners, 
which equals their level of interconnectedness or degree centrality within the 




information on more than 300 VC investments made in German during the years 
2004 and 2005.  
The analyses reveal that the German VC market is closely interconnected. 
The main component of the network shows that more than two-thirds of the VC 
firms within the used data are connected through syndicates. Furthermore, the 
visual and descriptive analyses provide evidence that some VC firms have 
considerably more relationships to syndication partners than others do. Therefore, 
a regression analysis is employed to explore the influence of several possible 
determinants of the network position of VC firms. The number of different co-
investors per VC company, which is an indicator for the degree centrality of the 
network position of VC firms, mainly depends on the VC companies’ age. Older 
VC investors seem to profit from advantages through more experience or a longer 
track record of investments than their younger counterparts. However, this effect 
diminishes over time and even turns into a negative influence. Other 
characteristics of the VC firm, including but not limited to the fact whether they 
are under governmental influence or not, do not show a statistically significant 
influence on the network position of the investor. Furthermore, the results indicate 
that the German VC syndicate network is not influenced by geographical or 
spatial aspects. Neither the location of the VC firms – this means a location either 
in one of the German VC centers or in a peripheral region – nor their spatial 
investment behavior affects their number of different syndication partners. 
The results of this study raise some questions that enhance the analysis and 
should be evaluated in further research. First, the network analysis should be 
enhanced by additional types of closeness than mere spatial proximity; these 
include the social, industrial or organizational proximity, and their role in the 
networks of the individual VC companies. Second, the influence of VC 
networking on the success of the investments is an interesting topic for further 
research (Hochberg, Yael, Alexander Ljungqvist and Lu Yang, 2007). Finally, 
syndication is only one aspect of VC networking. Although, this might be the 
most difficult and challenging task, further network contacts, for example on an 
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